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In Defense of the Langdell Tradition
T h e Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. *
This is a sentimental journey for me. Dallin Oaks and I were
colleagues a t the American Bar Foundation, where he was widely
respected as a scholar and splendid administrator. Although I
fully understood the priority of the high calling to become President of this University, I was distressed when he left the American Bar Foundation.
In view of my personal admiration and affection for Dallin
Oaks, I am especially happy to be on his campus on this memorable occasion. I have particularly enjoyed the opportunity of visiting with the students and faculty of the J. Reuben Clark Law
School .
At the student forum yesterday, a student-with some apprehension in his voice-asked me whether I really thought this
law school was a good one. One normally would be hesitant, if he
spoke honestly, to answer that question affirmatively about any
school that had not graduated a single class. Yet the fact is that
I am deeply impressed by what I have seen during my two days
here: a quality faculty already has been assembled; the physical
plant, especially the library, is second to none; and, perhaps most
important of all, the students display a spirit, dedication and
enthusiasm which are contagious.
The moot court yesterday afternoon was an unprecedented
one. It was composed of the entire active bench of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit,
and me-a full panel of nine judges. The participants had the
benefit of only two years of law school training. I agree, nevertheless, with the view expressed by Chief Judge David Lewis of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when he said that he had never
heard better moot court presentations.
In passing even a tentative judgment on a law school, one
must consider the university of which it is a part. Central to my
confidence in the quality of this law school is its relationship to
Brigham Young University, described this morning by the Chief
Justice as one of the finest centers of learning in the Western
World. With these assets, one may predict with confidence that
the J. Reuben Clark Law School will not merely. be a good one,
*Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
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but that in due time it will rank as a great one.
I am proud to have a part in the ceremonies here today, but
I am a bit puzzled as to what to say. Typically thoughtful, President Oaks suggested that I engage in pleasantries for about ten
minutes, rather than go to the trouble of preparing anything formal. The warmth of your hospitality, and the charm of your
campus, have indeed inspired me, but I doubt that I could manage ten minutes of pleasantries or that you could stand them.
Weighing my alternatives, and considering the importance of this
occasion, and the quality and influence of this audience, I have
decided to speak seriously-I promise, for only ten minutes.
We are all here today because of our interest in the new law
school. At the opening ceremony in August 1973, President Oaks
described the "expectations of the . . . University" for the law
school. With eloquence and conviction, he identified six expectations or goals. All are worthy, but I will comment only on one.
President Oaks said:
[T]he J. Reuben Clark Law School should concentrate on
teaching fundamental principles of law. Its approach should be
predominantly theoretical . . . . The law school should resist
the inevitable pressure to be too fashionable in curriculum or
instruction.

If I were tendering curricula advice to any law school, new or old,
Dallin Oaks' words would be my text.
The current fashion in law school curricula is "clinical legal
education." There is no precise definition of that phrase. It refers
generally to practical learning by doing. For many years law
schools wisely have afforded some "doing" experience through
law reviews, legal aid, and moot courts. But current usage of the
phrase connotes a great deal more. In its broadest reach, clinical
education encompasses any sort of practical training outside of
the traditional academic and theoretical teaching of law.
The most enthusiastic advocates of the "how to do it" approach openly challenge long accepted precepts of legal education. These precepts, as every lawyer knows, are rooted in the
teaching philosophy of Dean Langdell, who introduced them a t
Harvard in the 1870's. Langdell believed that the law should be
taught in a school, not in an apprentice's workshop. He perceived
law as an academic discipline, more or less self-contained and
susceptible to analysis as well as description. He discarded the
treatise in favor of the casebook, and he initiated that venerable
pedagogical device that has confounded and enlightened generations of first-year law students-the Socratic dialogue.
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To be sure, Langdell's method has not remained static. Casebooks now also include statutory materials, explanatory notes,
and commentary. Subjects are taught through lectures, in seminars, and in other formats that depart from rigid adherence to the
Socratic model. Increasingly, the study of law also is enriched by
reference to the social science disciplines. But for all of this, the
great law schools of our country are still building on the legacy
of Langdell.
I do not denigrate the need for or importance of some measured use of clinical instruction, with emphasis on advocacy. I
note, in passing, that such instruction is more likely to be meaningful when supervised closely by faculty and carefully integrated
with the academic curriculum. But I speak today in support of
the Langdell tradition in the law school.
This tradition views the law as an academic discipline whose
mysteries are revealed through rigorous doctrinal analysis of appellate cases. It is a tradition that has dominated our law schools
for 100 years. It has not survived for so long a time because it is
a particularly efficient way of teaching the catalog of rules and
exceptions that laymen characterize as the law. Indeed, it is not.
The enduring role of the Langdell tradition derives from the judgment, confirmed by long experience, that it is the best means yet
devised for imparting to students the capacity for analytical
thinking that is the essence of being a lawyer. As Attorney General Edward H. Levi, then President of the University of Chicago,
put it:
Law schools deserve their distinction because of their dedication
to the application of structured thought, with precision and persuasion, to complex human problems and transactions.
This capacity for analytical thought, including the ability to
reason independently of the pressures and fashions of the moment, is of timeless value. It is as critical today to genuine professional competence as it was when Langdell came on the scene in
1870.
Having this conviction, I commend this university on its insistence that the first duty of a law school is to teach the fundamental principles of law and legal analysis. Having known and
admired Dallin Oaks for many years, I am not surprised that he
listed this goal high among his expectations of the J. Reuben
Clark Law School.

